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Agricultural Productivity and the Distribution of Land; 
The Venezuelan Case 
Latin American economists and radicals never tire of pointing out 
the impact of agrarian structure on the output and growth rate of the agri.. 
cultural sector. They claim that the coexistence of "the latifundio" with 
its satellite "minifundia" and the widespread prevalence of share cropping 
and land occupation without title cause, not only a maldistribution of poli­
tical power, but substantial economic misallocation. Through their monop• 
sonistic control of the land, water and timber rights, and their manipulation 
of sharecrcpping and ~ental eontr~cts, the large landlord~ ean extract a sub• 
stantial surplus from the peasants. Moreover, the effect of this exercise 
of power is to squeeze the peasants onto their own small plots, to which they 
must devote too much labor in order to survive. At the same time land on 
the large farms is underutilized and often left completely idle. 
While the peasant's ability to migrate to the city mitigates the 
lanolord's power of exploitation, moving costs are certainly high. And once 
the peon reaches the city the employment opportunities are poor. Moreover 
the large landowners have often used a variety of legal means to restrict 
workers 1 mobility such as police codes on vagrancy, army impressment for 
service on lands, payments in kind or token money, debt peonage, and the 
threat of military or police intervention by the overseer, who wae often the 
local Chief of Police. In many cases, the landowners have also tried to 
prevent the development of feeder roads beyond their ot-m plentations. 
1 
Finally, high population growth rates and the large fraction of the pcpuletion 
which remains on the land reduce the impact of the large (absolute) mistatiolla 
2
which have been observed, leaving real rural wages roughly constant. 
-2-
The net result of this agrarian structure is low productivity and 
agricultural stagnation; 3 the radical solution to the problem is of course 
a "cambio de estructura," a major land reform and restrictions on rental 
sharecropping contracts. If this occurs, then output will grow once and for 
4
all through the correction of static misallocation, and again as the former 
tenants and minifundistas apply modern techniques which the latifundista 
was to lazy to adopt. 
Running counter to this argument is the conservative view that pro­
perty gravitates to those who administer it best. In other words, large 
farmers have obtained their holdings because they were more efficient than 
others and because they took advantage of technical improvements, such as 
the greater productivity of modern inputs. Being less tied to tradition 
than the peasant, the large land owners quickly switched to the most pro­
fitable crops and adopted new methods more rapidly. The resulting profits 
were then used to buy more land. If this view is true, then land redistri­
bution would lead to a substantial fall in output in the short run and a 
slo"'ing of technical progress in agriculture- This view is perhaps stated 
most concisely in the Mexican proverb that to give a beggar a donkey is 
simply a way of permitting him to ride to the devil. 5 
Finally, there is an intermediate case, which we shall term "Market 
Failure" based on the inability of market analysis to e]cplain observed 
phenomena without reference to information and transactions costs. For 
example, one might take the view that the average productivity of a given 
bundle of primary inputs--land, labor, and capital--is greater on large 
farms because of their greater use of profitable intermediate inputs. The 
smaller farmer does not use these intermediate inputs to the same degree 
because of transactions costs (e.g. the capital cost of a tractor may be too 
great for a small plot, yet the transactions necessary to share one may pre• 
vent farmers from combining to make the purchase. However, the new small 
Japanese tractors may reduce this problem.) Alternatively there are addi• 
tional information costs and risks involved when the small farmer adopts new 
fertilizers, switches to new crops, and gets credits. (On the other hand, 
the small farmers' credit costs may be higher because of discrimination in 
capital markets since in many cases the heads of the banks are the lati• 
fundistas). The remedy for low productivity and stagnant agriculture in 
this intermediate case of market failure, provided that the large landl~ds 
have not used their greater profits to buy up more land and obtain monopsony 
power, 6 is not land reform but the improvement of various markets, perhaps 
starting with government loans to small farm/ to take advantage of the 
8
economics of pooling risks and with the provision of technical information. 
It should be obvious that in practice it is difficult to distinguish 
which of these three views··-radical, conservative, or market failure--has 
greater validity. For example, if the lower use of intermediate inputs re­
flects costs of information, then case 3 blends into case 2. Further, lllisalloca• 
tion in case 1 and case 3 refers only to underproduction of goods. It is 
quite possible that given the income distribution the utility provided by 
✓ J 
the combination of goods and risk produced and the satisfaction obtained 
through discrimination in capital markets, in land ownership, or in work 
on ones own land is maximized. However, in either case 1 or 3 a land reform 
which broke up large estates would increase agricultural output if inter-
.J 
mediate inputs were held constant. Finally, it is also possible that the 
contracts which are made reflect factors which are difficult to measure such 
•. -+' . 
9 
as risk and that there is neithe:::- static nor dynamic misallocation. 
However, as is traditional in emi?irical research, we shall forge ahead by 
ignoring these points. 
It is also obvious that the 8ge old equity-efficiency argument is 
to the issue of land reform. The redistribution oftremendously relevant 
income, wealth, and power which accompanies a major land reform has important 
welfare aspects, and may be the maj':):-: argument for a land reform. However, 
we shall concentrate our efforts solely :!.:r. the im,estigation of the static 
ourproduction aspects of land reform. lO In particular discussion will be 
confined to the case of Venezuela, which by Latin American standards has a 
relatively good set of data on t~e agricultural sector. 
In the next section of this paper, the Venezuelan pattern of land 
tenure and distribution of farms by size of holdin;:;s will be discussed. 
Data presented there for the three census years (1936, 1950, 1961) will show 
that the uneven distribution of :::-ural lan•j which existed in Venezuela before 
the agrarian reform of the sixties, ·wac certainly representative of the 
• A • • ,_ 11 genera1 L a t in ~m?Yican pic~ure. Further, at least in the aggregate, the 
little despite the effortsconcentration of land ownership changed very 
at land refo::rn b8'.~:c,veen 19l:-5 and 19l~8 and the renewal of these efforts, to­
12 
and earlygether with some occupation of latifundia in the late fifties 
sixties. -')n the :-:-·::·· h;:md this would seem to reduce the danger that the 
13· 1 · b · · · . . d . t is. in· d.isequi i r1.um, increasings t rue t ure c f 1_,a-:::-d m-mership an inves rne.::1.t 
confidence in the s·::--:1tistical eetimates of the production function. Hm•1ever, 
it would seera to preseI'.t some probl~::ns in ~he testing of the hypotheses 
about the effects of uneven dist::ibutior. on output and growth, for a stable 
it is difficult to separate the effect of o,;-mershipovmership st::-uctm:-2 !"'.l~ans 
structure :'.:~:'.'::"1 ·::1e diffe::·P.c!:::"'f' in t.he average productivity of states. 
In Section 3 a~ricultural production functions are estimated for 
Venezuela using ordinary least squares and the analysis of covariance 
method. Section 4 develops a heretofor unused test for static misalloca­
tion and Section 5 applies it to the Venezuelan agricultural economy in 
1950 and 1961. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the basic 
findings, namely that the data seem to indicate that a substantial static 
misallocation of land existed in 1961 and that the land reform, 'tvhich took 
effect at that time, combined with the devaluation and improved markets 
for intermediate inputs, probably explains most of the rapid growth of 
Venezuelan agriculture during the sixties, However, the major problem was 
one of ownership structure not tenure conditions. 
II. Land Tenure ia Venezuela 
The Venezuel2n a:::;ricultural economy would seem to be an excellent 
ease for testing the rel2tive merits of the three hypotheses advanced earlier 
(radical, conservative and market failure). From the three Venezuelan agri• 
cultural censi (1936, 1950, 1961) relatively good data on land tenure, farm 
size and inputs can be obtained. .As will be sho,vn below, the ownership of 
land is very uneven in Venezuela but the aggregate structure of ownership 
and tenure was relatively stable, at least until 1961. 
Tables I and II summarize the available aggre3ate data on the per­
centage distribution of total land by farm size and tenure classifications. 
Each entry in Table I represents the percentage of land held under a certain 
tenure arrangement (owne!.", renter) share cropper, squatter) on farms of a 
certain size. Thus, Table I, Col. 4, line 3 shows that in 1950 1. 5 percent 





















Number of Farms 
.12.2.Q l2tl>1--k 
234,730-lri<* 320, 094-lrtt' 
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Total land held 
1936/7 23,370,503.0 ha source: MAC Reforma Agraria, Caracas, 1959, _vol. II, p. 494. 
1950 · 22, 126,640. 0 ha DGE II Censo Agropecuario I, pp. 39-69.----------...:. .1961 26,004,861.1 ha DGE III Censo Agropecuario XIX, PP• 131, 157, 183. '------------.> -
Each class does not include farms of the last she. 
1961 figure includes 4617 rural exploitations without land,• 
In 1950, 6,058 exploitations with 795,367.3 ha (3,,6% of land) were operated beneath multiple forms of tenure. 
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Percentage Distribution of Cultivated ~-,\o 
As a % of total As a %, of own As a% of total 
land land cultivated land 
Farm Size 1950 1961 1950 11§1. Tenure Class 11§1. 
Under 5 ha • 9 • 9. 82 69 Prop. 3. 5 
5-20 1. 6 1. 8 57 33 s. c. and Renters .8 
20-100 1. 3 1. 4 28 23 Occupants 2. 1 
Over 100 2.1 2.3 2 3 
-
Total 5.9 6.4 5. 9 6.4 Total 6.4 
Total Cultivated Land 
(Crops) 
1936/7 730, 000. O ha 
1950 1,302,116.0 ha 
1961 1,669,351.4 ha 
*Permanent and.transitory crops, excludes cultivated pastures. 
Sources: See Table 1. 










while col. 4, line 7 shows that 6807 percent was operated under proprietor• 
ship on farms of over 1000 ha. The column totals represent the total per-
centages of the land held under each class of tenure, eog., col. 4, line C 
shows that proprietors held 83.2 percent of the land in 1950. The row 
totals represent land on farms of a certain size, e.g., farms between 5 and 
20 ha in size held 1.0 percent of the land in 1936, 2.C percent in 1950 
and 3.5 percent in 1961. 
The most obvious point to be made from inspecting Table I is the ex­
treme inequality of land holdings, which is characteristic of so many 
• • 1£'.:.Latin .American countries. This is especially true since much of the land 
in the last three tenure categories probably belongs to the large owners. 
Further, since farms held by different members of the same family and farms 
which are not in the same "municipio" are both treated as separate exploita­
tions, concentration of ownership, as opposed to operation, is probably even 
higher than shown" The data in Tble I also suggest a slight reduction in 
size inequality over time, with the land being divided up into more me:lium 
and smaller plots, and this is borne out by the Gini coefficients of concen­
tration which were .925 in 1936, (strongly affected by the 89.0 percent in 
farms of over 1000 has, and e}ccluding the lands of the dictator, Gomez), 
• 9l~6 in 1950, and • 909 in 1%1, where 1 represents perfect inequality--every-
t ongs one . represents per f equa1·i ty f d' 'b · lS 
l-Jhile progress has been made since 1936, the reduction in inequality has, 
h ing. be1 to unit•·· and 0 ect o istrJ. ut1.on. 
in fact, been slight in the decade before the land reform of 1960. 
Table II shows that at least in 1950 and E'Gl the percentage of cul­
tivated land was much higher on small farms, though the percentages declined 
from 1950 to 1961. On the smallest farms (under 5 ha) it was over 80 
percent in 1950 and 70 percent in 1961 compared with around 25 percent in 
the farms between 20 and 100 ha and less than 3 percent in the farms over 
100 ha. The prevalence of uncultivated lands on large farms has been ob• 
A- • d' 16 served in. most Latin. t11nerican stu ies. Hm-1ever some, though not all, of 
the differences in the percentages of cultivation are due to the fact that 
many of the large farms are cattle ranches in the llanos, which are not very 
useful for cultivation due to annual flooding. With small and medium sized 
farms cultivating so much of their available land, and large farms culti• 
vating so little, we find that (a) a very small percentage of land is cul• 
tivated (5.9 percent in 1950, 6.l:. percent in 1%1), (b) that more than half 
of the cultivated land is on the farms under 100 ha (M. percent in both 1950 
and 1961) and (c) the distribution of cultivated land is more even than 
that of total land, as shown by Gini coefficients of • 505 in 1950 and •.SOl:. 
in 1961. Finally, we should note that although there has been some move• 
ment toward a more equal distribution of cultivated land, in the aggregate 
the relative fractions of land cultivated on the different size £arms has 
not changed much between 1950 and 1961. This stability, as well as the xe• 
lative stability of the various size and tenure classifications sholNtl in 
Table I suggests that aggregate estimation of agricultural production 
case iffunctions is feasible, or at least more feasible than would be the 
there had been signffieant changes in size distributions and/or the structure 
of land tenure. However, the stability of land distribution in each state•• 
the Gini coefficients of total land holdings usually change less than tvJo 
percent--would seem to make it difficult to separate the effect of owner­
ship structure from differences in the productivity of each state. 
•• .L (, • 
The usual a;:;proach to testing the three conflicting hypotheses 
(radical, conserva~~ve, market failure) about static misallocation and rates 
of technical change would require data on individual farms. Then production 
functions, technical change, and marginal products of different factors on 
the different farm sizes o:.· farms c--1.i.tivat::d under different tenure arrange­
ments would be esti~:ated and co:nparedo 0£ ccu:tse there are many pitfalls 
in this approach) such as the diffi~ulty of separating biased technical 
progress and the elasticity of Sc:bstitutio:l, 
17 
Moreover, even assuming a simple 
cross-sec~ional Cobb Douglas function with neutral technical progress leads 
to the well-knoi:,m s"'.:atistical p:oblems in :i.dentification, owing to the pro-
. . . . . lG
fit max1.m).z1.ng c:md1.t1.ons. In ac-:dition, the usual estimates of the 
biased, it is difficult tovariances of the msrginal products are and so 
construct confidence intervals ,,if.th which '':O test the equality of, 
labor=s marginal product on, say, large and small farms. 
19 Since Venezuela, 
in common with most less developec! countries, lacks such cross-sectional 
20 
sample survey da::a, even this app.:~oach cannot be used. As an alternative, 
indirect estination procedure, using as observations the state, district,an 
and even 11 ,nunici.pio" values of outpnt d::;·::a on oifferent sizes of farms might 
be tried. Howev::;r, ,1hiJ.e statew:i.de data on outputs and most inputs is 
available by si22 cf .fa:::1,'. a:id i.n ss':le cases by t.enure classes, even a 
rough breakdown ::,f J. ubc::- '.:.Se or:. diffcre:1-;: size farms and farms operated under 
different tenur2 class2s is ~navail2ble. ITonetheless, as will be described 
below, it is still possible-" to rr,ake sor~e tests of the static efficiency. 
As a p:-elim::.na~::y to thes'.:. tests ,-,e estimate a statewide production 
. . d . 21.f unctl.OU i:1 C~Op pro UC~l0~s ?:'., b•lgir.. let u J assume that the crop production 
of each state is subject to an aggregate production function which differs 
only in the constant term) 
22 
due to random, log normally distributed, 
multiplicative, interstate differences in soil, rainfall, etc. For the sake 













where (~ = gross value crop output) measured in E57 prices (Banco 
th 
Central de Venzuela, Memoria 1959, Caracas, 1961) in the j 
state in year t 
th th 
X~. = stock of the 1 factor used in the j state in year t 
l.J 
P. = output elasticity of the i th factor 
1. 
t u. = the log of ~he random neutral·•multiplicative difference in 
J 
efficiency in state j in year tc It ,vas assumed that the 
distribution of u is normal with constant variance. As an 
t 
alternative) to correct for heteroskedasticity, estimates 
based on per farm data were tried. However, they showed little 
or no change in either the coefficients or standard errors of 
the regression. 
Only stock variables were available (except fertilizer which is a 
23 
flow) and it seemed that any attempt to derive a service flow would only 
bias the estimatee in an unknown direction,. Further, by using the stocks 
of inputs and assuming that in the aggregate producers maximize expected 
outputs but are confronted with a random disturbance in any given year, we 
. 1 t. . . 24hope t oreduce s1.mu taneous equa 1.on 01.as. 
With the exception of the labor figures, all data from the study 
have been taken from the sources listed in ~able I. As to labor, two 
-12-
estimates of the labor force engaged in crop production in each state 
during 1961 were used, one based on the 1950 population census (applying 
the 1950 ratios of crop to total agricultural workers to the figures for 
agricultural workers shown in the 1961 population census) and the other 
based on the results of a BCV sample survey on the percentage of hired time 
. 251 . k production. However there was 
little difference in the two results and the paper presents only those 
estimates based on the first method. 
In an effort to reduce the problem of differences in land quality 
only cultivated land has been used. Thus pasture land was omitted from 
the independent variables and the value of livestock output from the depen­
dent. In addition, the observations for the Venezuelan states of Apure, 
Nueva Esparta, and the Federal Territories were not included since it was 
felt that there were substantial differences between the land quality in them 
26 
spent on crop as opposed to ivestoc 
and in the rest of Venezuela. 
Table III contains the results of Equation (1) estimated for lSSO, 
1961, and for both years, using census data, together with the Standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients-output elasticities in parentheses. 
Coefficients which are significantly different from zero at the 95 percent 
level are indicated with one asterisk, at the 90 percent level with two 
asterisks. 
In all these cases the sum of the coefficients is somewhat less 
than one, though not significantly different from one at the 95 level as 
shown by the F statistics at the bottom of the table (These F statistics 
were calculated from a comparison of the unconstrained and constrained 




Constant 7.24* (. 66) 
L Tract .10* (. 05) 
L Frtlz -.07* (. 03) 
L Irrig .02 (. 04) 
L-Livestock -.09 (. 07) 
L Lab .10 (. 21) 
L Land .72* ( .19) 
L Cofca .11* (. 04) 
Dummy .09 ( .12) 
~ Coeff .89*** 
2 





F Test of Equal of Coe£ 50 & 60 
DF = 7, 22 
F Test of(Dif from 1, DF=l, lJF F = 1. 7 3 
* Sig. Dif. from zero at the .95 level 
** Sig. Dif. from zero at the .90 level 
***. Not sig. dif. from one at the 95% level 
1950 .1961 
6.85* (1.19) 7.38* (1.05) 
.10 (. 07) .10 ( .12) 
-.09* (. 04) .10 ( .10) 
.02 (. 09) -.03 I ~ .07) 
-.04 ( .10) -.08 ( .12) 
-. 06 . (. 37) .19 (. 48) 
.85* (. 30) .67* (. 42) 
.13** (. 09) .04 (. 07) 
• 91*** .99*** 





F = 1.09, 
F = .5 F = .03 
., 13 
coefficients sum to one,) Thus the aggregate production function can be 
said to <lisp lay the convenient property of constant returns to scale. 
the depen­However, even a sum somewhat greater than one m:i.ght bt:: expected as 
not bedent variable is gross output not value added, and in any case would 
disturbing as there is some difficu1ty in interpreting returns to scale in 
an aggregate production functionc 
The next to last line of the table represents the result of an F 
test for a difference in the output elasticiti.es in the two periods, using 
the three regressions shovm. Since the li statistlc is so low we must con­
clude that the output elasticities are not significantly different at the 
95 percent or even 90 percent level. ·:L1er2fore it seems safe to assume 
that one Cobb Douglas production functisn prevailed in the two years and 
that a CES p·rod·,.,ction furction or non ,1eutraJ. technical change would not 
be attractive alternative assumptions" 
As shm-vn in th2 combined i-egre:rnion of '.I' able 11:;:, the estimated 
output elasticities of tractors, t~ees, and land are significantly positive, 
while those of labor> e::.,cl irrigation are posUive Lut insignificant. While 
other empirical •;,Jork has usually not ~ound any st,ong :celation between 
irrigation and output, the lov labor coefficient relative to the standard 
error is surprising and might be attributed to errors in measurement, or to 
multicollinearity) since the simple cor!:elation c.:::,efficient of land and 
labor is aroeud c9, Finally) the coefficients of livestock and fertilizer 
are negativeo The later result, so contrary to the usual empirical evidence, 
might be explained by errors in measur2ment, 
27 
by the high correlation co­
efficient between fertilizer and somP. of the other variables, particularly 
tractors (about , 7 in the logs), or by 2 st;rnng positive correlation 
between fertilizer use and farm size, ,,ihich, if the radical I s contention 
holds up, is inversely related to statewide output. 
It is also possible to argue that these :selatively poor results 
may be attributed to a simultaneous equation bias, due to an incorrect 
assumption of independence between the mobile factors and the error term. 
In other words, some states were, on the average, more productive, and his­
torical½' attracted a relatively large stock of the more mobile factors. 
This obviously violates the assumptions required for unbiased regression 
estimates, namely that the error terms and independent variables are inde-
28
pendent. 
The best way to correct for this "managernenttt bias would be the 
explicit introduction of factor supply functions but, as mentioned earlier, 
factor price data is generally unavailable. Another alternative is the well 
known analysis of covariance approach (ACV) for dealinG with cross sectional 
29
time series. This approach involves splitting the error term into time, 
state, and random components through the use of separate intercepts or 
dummies for each state and each year. 
Table IV presents the results of an unqualified use of the ACV 
approach, including estimates of the intercepts for each state. As can be 
seen, there is a substantial increase in the coefficients of labor and live­
stock. In addition, the coefficients of coffee-caco trees and irrigation 
also increase, vJhile the coefficients of land and of tractors fall. While 
management bias in the usual firm models usually leads to an overestimate 
tee1asticities· 
3o . aggregate h 1 . '" t so . andor '" h · · in· tne t e resu t ir no certain 
would appear to depend, at least in partj on the relative factor mobilities. 




L Tract -.02 
L Frtlz -.10* 
L Irrig .07* 
L Livestock .23 
L Lab .62* 
L Land .44* 
L Cofca .39* 
Dummy -.01 
Other 
r; Coeff 1.63 


















-.08** (. 05) 
-.06* (. 02) 
.10* (. 03) 
.15** ( .11) 
.30** (. 2 3) 
.54* (.15) 
.43* (. 08) 





























1] To calculate the 
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-.31 (. 65) -1.21 (. 41) 
-1.30 (. 52) 
-.36 (. 49) 
-.33 (. 54) .-.83 (. 43) 
-.12 (. 38) -.54 (. 32) 
-.43 (. 52) 
.30 (. 38) -.26 (. 30) 
-1.51 (. 55) 
~-, 5..,)-.89 ~ 
-1.45 (. 61) 
-1.60 (. 65) 
-1.16 (. 58) -1.64 (. 42) 
r.!,, =i V".; ,....,..... C:+-;:i+-oc (Q 1 .1. 1 Q\
',;l'-"',1-4.J-.J..'-\J River ....,'-_'-_...., \-'I ... ~ , ...~, 
-1.13 (. 56) -1.23 (. 37) 
Anz, Mon (2, 13) 
-.89 (. 49) -1.55 
Dry Coastal Plain (8, 10, 15) 
-1.60 (. 64) -1.86 (. 43) 
-1.59 (. 67) 
Andes (11, 16, li} 
-1.91 (. 63) ,;_2 . 12 (. 45) 
Ar, Cara (3, 6) 
-.70 (. 50) -.97 (. 33) 
-1.14 (2. 80) 1.43 (. 93) 
appropriate state intercept,the figure shown should 
be added to the figure for Zulia. 
i7-
evidence, where the sum of the output elasticities of land, trees, and irri­
gation increases, and in Timmer's estimation for the U.S. 31 On the other 
hand the coefficients of most mobile factors would appear to fall, as 
shown by the decrease in the coefficients of tractors and fertilizers. 
Finally, the factors with intermediate mobility··- livestock-,in the. U,. s. and 
Venezuela, and as argued in the introduction, labor in Venezuela, but not 
in the u.s.--would also tend to rise. And interpreted in this way, the rise 
in the Venezuelan labor coefficient indicates some immobility and holds 
some promise of empirically measurable monopsony power. 
All the coefficients are now significant at ,the 95 percent level 
except livestock (significant at about the .G percent level) and tractors. 
Fertilizer again remains significantly negative. The estimated sum of the 
coefficients is now much greater than one, and significantly different at 
the • ~JS _level. Howeve~ the sum is B.~ significantly different than 1. OG 
which, as discussed above, seems reasonable when the dependent variable is 
gross value of output. 
While the state dummies are generally significant and the hypothesis 
of a single constant is easily rejected, many of the dummies are obviously 
not very different from one another. In addition the coefficient of the 
time variable, \-,hich is usually taken to be technical change, has now 
shifted to (insignificantly) negative. And, of course, the assumptions 
of ACV method prohibits any test of nonneutral shifts in the production 
function with data from only two periods. 
32
As pointed out else°\vhere, the ACV estimates neglect the variation 
between individual and period means and use only the deviations from these 
means in their estimates of the output elasticities, making them somewhat 
- lL· 
inefficient. One simple method that has been suggested for improving the 
ACV results along these lines is a combination 0£ some of the state dummies 
based on an observed similarity of temperature, climate, rainfall, and land 
f erti·1·1 ty. 33 In the Venezuelan case, it seems reasonable to argue that cer-
tain groups of states such as (1) the Venezuelan Andes (Merida, ;.: fornmy 11); 
T~chira (16), and Trujillo (17)); (2) the dry coastal states (Falcon (OG), 
Lara (10), and Sucre (15)}; (3) the states lying in the Guarico river 
basin (Guarico (09), Portugesa (14) and Yaracuy (13)); the states around 
Lake Vdencia (Aragua (03) and Carabobo (06)); and the eastern agricultural 
states U,nzoategui (13) and Monagas (13)) are essentially the same in terms 
of long-run average fertility. If this is true, the states in each group 
would have the same intercept or dummy variable, and the same long-run 
attractiveness to mobile factors. Observed differences viithin these groups 
can then be interpreted as random disturbances, uncorrelated with the inde­
pendent variables, increasing the efficiency of the estimates. 
The results of these new regressions are also shown in Table IV. 
As is to be expected, following the previous argument, there is some decline 
in the individual coefficients, particularly labor's output elasticity. 
However all coefficients remain different from zero at the 95 percent level 
except labor (.85), and any loss in its significance is partially offset 
11 t 11by the improvement in the statistic of the livestock coefficient. 
Though the sum is still greater than one, it is much smaller, and not 
to the statesignificantly different than L OC at the 95 percent level. As 
dummies, again almost all are significant and a comparison with the first 
column shows almost no loss in the explanatory po-vier, as measured by SSE 
or in R,
2 due to the combination of states" In fact a test of the combined 
-lS·· 
versus uncombined dummy hypotheses yields an F statistic of only 1.45, 
showing the two approaches are essentially the same. Finally the modified 
state coefficients seem to match our a priori conjectures about fertility 
quite well, with the area around Lake Maracaibo in Zuliay the most productive, 
the area around Valencia next, the Guarico basin third, and the dry coastal 
states followed by the Andes, which are subject to all the difficulties of 
mountain farming, bringing up the rear. Thus the modified ACV approach 
seems to provide the most reliable estimates of the cross state aggregate 
production functionc 
Given the crude nature of the <lata--stocks umJeighted by prices, 
or rates of service flow, imperfect estimates af the stock of labor, 
etc.--it is surprisin3 that the zesults are as good as they are. A compari­
son of the results ~ith the estimates of Griliches (ACV, U.3. 1949, 54, 59) 
•Ruttan-Hayami (3G country cross 0 section of LDC 
1 s & DC' s 1960) and Timmer 
(U.S. 1960 to 1%9), which .::1re shown in Table V; indicates a striking 
similarity. Our labor coefficient (,, 30) lies ,•iithin the r.:mge of the other 
estimates, our land coefficient is somewhat high and livestock somewhat low, 
but this is probably due to the difference in cove~age-crop in Venezuela, 
crop plus livestock in the others. The coefficient of neutral technical 
change is similar to the value obtained 1::y Griliches. And although the sum 
of the coefficients is somewhat large::::- than the others, it is not unreasonably 
greater than Griliches 2 resulto Moreover, in the case of irrigation and 
lacknot or 
of data in the other studies--the strong results of the Venezuela study tend 
to confirm the other investigatm:-s' conjectures.. Only in the case of 
tractors and fertilizer are the results really different and this may be 
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due to errors in measurement, biasing the ACV coefficients downward, .2s 
Timmer has suggested in the explanation of his inability to estimate the 
capital coefficient satisfactorily. 
IV. A Test of Static Misallocation 
Turning to the question of static efficiency or the lack thereof, 
we test the radical view of static misallocation against the conservat~ve 
view of economic efficiency by an indirect method. Let us assume constant 
returns to scale, competitive factor use, and, for the present, homogeneity 
of cultivated land t~roughout a state. 
Under these conditions similar quantities of production factors would 
be applied to the same qu-:ntity of land, regardless of ,·1hether it was cul­
tivated by small or lar3e farmers or whether it was tilled by proprietors, 
-:is
share croppers, or tenants.~ As a result; the marginal productivity of 
cultivated land, whether on large or small farms and independent of the 
tenure systems under ,-1hich it was cultivated., would be equal. Redistribution 
of land from cne group of farmers to another, other inputs held constant, 
would not change total statewide output. Equation (1) essentially assumes 
that these conditions hold, as total land ,·ias "constrained" to have a 
constant output elasticity and therefore each type has an equal marginal 
productivity. 
An alternative way of arriving at the same proposition would be to 
think of each state as a large farm with its observed distribution of culti• 
vated land between large and small farms and between the different tenure 
systems. Efficient allocatio:i by a manager uould req_uire an intra- state 
allocation of the mobilP- inputs ~vhich ~•muld equate marginal products on the 
-22 ... 
same quality land, whether it was part of a latifundio or a share-cropper's 
or squatter's minifundia. On the other hand, systematic misallocation by 
the farm managers in each state would mean that relatively too many factors 
were applied to the land on certain size farms or on farms which were operated 
under one of the three tenure classifications. Therefore, the land on 
farms of that size of that tenure system would have a higher merginal pro-
duct than the other types of land. 
As discussed earlier, the radicals argue that the effect of the 
"latifundistas" monopsony power and tenure rules is to reduce labor on the 
largest farms below the competitive optimum and to squeeze the peons onto 
small plots, to which, in order to keep alive, they apply too much labor. 
Thus, land on the minifundia would have higher productivity, land on the 
latifundia lower productivityn And while the radicals do not extend the 
argument to the intermediate size farms, presumably they too should use "too" 
much labor relative to the large farms. Since they are also regarded as 
modern, employing large amounts of intermediate inputs, one might expect 
that the marginal products of their cultivated land would be even greater. 
On the other hand, the conservative view would imply equal marginal pro­
ductivity of land on all farm sizes and tenure classifications. In fact 
it seems very likely that marginal productivity of land on the largest farms 
should exceed that on the small, since it could be argued that the lati-
. 36fundistas chose the best land, and use more of the modern inputs. 










where c = quantity of output measured in 1957 prices 
L. = land cultivated under tenure classific~tion i or land cultivated 
l. on farm size i 
i = r,s and r, s refer to different tenure classifications or 
farm sizes and class, "r" refers to a laru;er farm or one with 
more property rights than class ns." For example, when treating 
farms of different sizes, s, and r might take on values 0-100 
ha and over 100 ha, class "r" always above 11 s" in size. 
Hm·,ever, when comparing the prodµcti vi ty of land on farms cul• 
tivated under the different tenure arrangements, r arid stake 
on the values proprietor, renter, and sharecropper, squatter, 
with class ilr" always referring to the group with more pro­
perty rights. 
Although there is obviously some overlap of size and tenure classi-
fications, we will test separately for the competitive nllocation of labor 
among farms of different sizes, and among farms operated under different 
tenure arrangements. 
To apply this test, we need an unconstrained version of the cross­
state production function of Equation (1). He ,10uld then test whether the 
assumption of the null hypothesis, i.ec constraining the aggregate produc­
tion function to an equality of marginal products, si3nificantly worsens 
the fit obtained ~-Jith an unconstrained production function. 
We assume the form of the unconstrained production function is: 
i=k t i=n 
(;t t t
2) log Qj = A. + At + I: p. log xij + E f.!. log X.. + u. J l. 1. l.J ji=l i=k+l 
where all variables have the same interpretation as previously and the 
factors uumbered k+l ton are the amounts of land in state . which are cul­
J 
37tivated on different size farms or under different tenure arrangements. 
Using Eq. 2 we can then test the proposition that the land quality 
in each size, class, or tenure is the same, This test is simply that there 
is no significant difference in the output elasticities of land cultivated 
under different tenure arrangements or on different size farms. If that 
hypothesis is accepted, ,-Je can then move to the test of equality of marginal 
products. Basically this test uses the CD property that the marginal p~oduct 
equals the average product multiplied by the output elasticity. Substitu­
tion into the null hypothesis above and simple manipulation yield: 
or 
3] H :b "'.>i3L/Lo r- sr s 
constraint by substituting.Assuming equality (or H), this can be used as a 
the right side of 3] for~ and comparing the resultin~ constrained form r 
can be used becausewith an unconst:rained form of Eq. 2. This manipulation 
the form of Eq. 2 implies each type of land enters separately in determining 
aggregate output and thus the 2-,1erage product of each type of land has the 
same numerator, Q .., 
J 
Further, the direction of the i.nequali ty could be determined by 
assuming the ratio of the differences in marginal products is a constant 
fraction, R, across states" 
Then Equation 3 becomes 
P = R (-3 L /L
r s r s 
and after substitution the test of our hypothesis becomes 
H'. MP > MP 
o r - s 
,'\ ,'\ 
I:-LMP <MP =~fl· < p 
a r s s s 
where ,.., represents estimated values and 
is estimated by regression with a new variable, 
Log X . • L ./Lsj.rJ rJ 
Differences in land productivity could be handled in similar fashion, by 
making assumptions about R based on estimated output elasticities. 
V. Results of the Test: Venezuela 
Table VI presents the results of the tests for static misallocation 
described in the previous section, In an effort to keep the presentation 
manageable the estimates of the state intercepts have been omitted and only 
the results for the modified ACV approach are shown. The results of the 
unmodified ACV and the 01S approaches, ,,hich are similar, are shown in the 
statistical appendix, TLbles AI and All. 
Col. 1 of Table VI presents a regression (unconstrained) estimate 
JC 
of Eq. 2, using two types of land, land on farms over and under 100 has. 
Both of the estimates (.l,O and .15) are significantly positive at the 95 
percent level. A test for differences in the two elasticities, was negative, 
as shown in the next column, which reports the constrained equation and the 
F statistic of the constraint of equal marginal products. (F = 2. i3 
DF 1, lD). Thus there is no statistical difference in land quality. 
In contrast, the assumption of equality of land's marginal products 
is strongly rejected. Col. 3 presents the results of a re6ression estimate 
using Equation 3, i.e., assuming equality of marginal products and substi­
tuting for one of the output elasticities. This assumption or constraint 
significantly worsens the fitted regression line, as shown by a comparison 
of the standard errors of CoL 3 and CoL 1, where marginal products of land 
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TABLE VI 
COL. 1 COL. 2 COL. 3 COL. 4 
Modified Constrained Constrained Size of Differ-
ACV Equal Equal ence in Marginc. 
Two Land output Marginal Products 
Sizes Elasticities Products 
L Tract -.07 (. 06) - . 09** (. 06) -.12* (.07) -.11* (. 06) 
L Frtlz -.06* (. 03) -.08* (. 02) -.10* (. 03) -.08* (. 03) 
L Irrig .09* (. 04) . 09* (. 04) .12* (. 04) .10* (. 03) 
L Livestock . 19** ( .13) .10 (. 11) -.09 ( .15) .07 (. 14) 
L Lab .27 (. 2·6) .45* (. 24) . 95* (. 21) .41** (. 24) 
C Cofca. .45* (. 09) .42* (. 09) .39* (. 10) .42* (. 08) 
Dummy (Time) -.15* (. 16) .01 ( .12) .27 (. 24) .11 (. 20) 
L Land urrler 100 ha .40* ( .14) 
L Land Over 100 ha .15** ( .10) 
L Land < 100 & 
L Lane! > 100 .23* (. 09) 
L Land (MP 's =) • 04** (. 02) 
L Land Under 100 ha .47* (. 13) 
L Land Over lOO•Lr/Ls .04* (. 02) 
F vs. Col. 1 DF = 1, 18 2.13 5.80 n.a. 
2 
R .984 • 982 • 979 .987 
F 58 58 49 69 
Obs 38 38 38 38 
DI' 18 19 19 18 
SSE .254 .284 .336 .214 
SER .12 .12 .13 .11 
·•27-
may differ but the fit is not necessarily the best. In other words, it 
would be a serious error to assume the marginal product of cultivated land 
is the same on small and large farms. 
Finally, Col. 4 presents estimates of the direction of the in­
equality, as described by Eq. L:., where the marginal products differ by a con­
stant ratio. The estimated coefficient of land on the farms under 100 ha 
(.47) is almost twelve ti~reater than the coefficient of land on large 
farms (adjusted following Lr] e). In turn this means the marginal product is 
also twelve times larger, in spite of the aforementioned high correlations 
between large farms and tractors, irrig~tion, and fertilizer. It also 
seems unlikely that this great difference could be explained solely by the 
differences in quality shown in Col. 1; in fact, to account for this difference 
at even the 95 percent significance level the land on small farms would have 
. d . 39to b e 5 times more pro uctive. 
To summarize: Table VI shows that although land quality is roughly 
the same on farms over and under 100. has., its marginal product is much 
higher on smaller farms. By our earlier argument this can only occur if 
labor use on small farms is greater, for in general the larger farms tend to 
use more of the other, modern inputs. Thus the radical's monopsony power 
or at least some of the market imperfections discussed in footnote 8 such 
as preference for work on one's own land or non maximizing latifundistas 
seem to exist. It follows that a reduction in the unequal distribution of 
land would, ceteris parabis, increase output. lmd the percentage of land 
cultivated would probably rise. However if the simple market model also 
breaks down because of information costs, etc., which favor the large farms, 
then other inputs might fall with a land reform, offsetting the ceteris 
. t. (. 
parabis effects. Thus any land reforming Venezuelan government would have 
to be careful to provide such inputs or risk losing any output gains. 
The available evidence seems to indicate that such a policy was 
attempted in Venezuela during the sixties with some success, at least as 
measured by aggregate agricultural growth and competitiveness in world markets. 
After passage of the Agrarian Reform Act of 19GO, the ruling party 
and its peasant federation agreed to stop using land invasion as a tactic. 
Instead, both groups committ2d themselves to the creation of a new class of 
small family ferm owners, It uas their intent to organize settlements (now 
numbering almost 900) on purchased or public lands and within these settle-
ments to parcelize the 12nd, c:.nd provide housing, ,1ater, market roads and 
extension services. A special compesino program ~Jas organized by the govern-
ment agricultural credit bank and modern :i..nputs such as new seeds, ferti-
1 . d inery ·were 1.iect sub · d · prices.· 
4oizers, an mach. supp - at si ized Though the 
definitive study has yet to be done) the program has drawn critics who have 
suggested that it v,as too expeusive.·and toe much41 and others who suggested 
42
that it was too little, and too extensive. However, one available study 
does support the results of this paper; finding that even those programs 
without much investment i.n auxiliary services would raise output. Hm-1ever, 
rates of return are low if the cost of land is included, and rise when more 
43
auxiliary services are added, lending support to the market f2.ilure approach. 
Based on the above evidence one might expect rapid agricultural 
growth in Venezuela during the 8arly sixties,. Though no causal relation 
can be proved, this is ex;;,ctly vhc:t did occuro From a lagging sector in the 
fifties, agriculture becmr:e a lE.ad:Lng sector in the sixties> in an economy 
l+L•. 
suffering from a slowdovm in the growth of its major export, petroleum. · 
-29-
Production also seemed to increase in international competitiveness, as 
non-traditional agricultural exports grevi at nearly double the rate of the 
economy during the period 1961 to 1966. Compared ,d-th other major Latin 
American countries, the overall performance is even mo:re striking; only 
Venezuela and Mexico were able to increase per capita food output during the 
sixties.
45 Finally, the results of this paper would also suggest that once 
the static reallocation effects were achieved, agricultural growth would slow 
down without continued investment or technical p".."ogress. Again the aggregate 
evidence is consistent constant, showing some slo,-;ing of the agricultural 
. . l:-6
growth rate in the late s1.xt1.es, though again no causal relation or proof 
of the hypothesis can be claimed. 
Turning to the test of differences between the productivity of tenure 
classes, we first comp~re the output elasticities of land cultivated by pro­
prietors, renters 0 •sharecroppers, and squatters using the methods described by 
Eqs. 2, 3, and 4. Since data from 1950 on the distribution of cultivated 
land by tenure classes were unavailable, only the OLS method could be used. 
The results for regressions using the three classes are presented in 
Table VII7 however; there ,·,as little or no difference ,vhen the comp
arisons 
i-1ere made between owners and non owners. As might be expected, given the 
paucity of observations and the difficulty with OLS, the results are much 
poorer than those by farm size~ Although land cultivated by squatters has 
the highest output elasticity, there vJas no significant difference between 
the three coefficients. Further there was also no significant difference 
betvJeen the three marginal products, imp lying that any breakdown in markets 
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paper are in accord with the work of CheungJ who demonstrates that no static 
misallocation will arise from competitively determined sharecropping arrange-
47ments. The crucial breakdo·wn in markets would seem to be the result of 
the large farm-small farm structure, rather than the tenure structure. 
This conclusion is also supported by an alternative analysis. 
Cheung finds static efficiency and would use differences in crop risks and 
transactions costs to explain differences in the percentage of sharecropped 
land. More recently Bardhan and Srinivasan have pointed out that Cheung 
neglects tenant maximization and when this is introduced there vJill be some 
. 11 . 48ml.Sa ocat1.onr They then show that parametric shifts in the wage would 
increase the percentage of land shar2cropped; as would land augmenting 
49
innovation" The authors confirm these results ,vi.th tests on Indian data• 
50J.Applying the Bardhan-Srinivasan test to Venezuelan statewide data 
we obtain the following regression, similar to that used in their original 
article: 
Log PCT Share Cropped= .35 - 2.94 Log Wage+ .58 Log Irrigation 
SE (5. 3) (2. 00) (. 2 9) 
DF = 15 
R2 .= .30. 51 
The low coefficient of determination is roughly the same as those 
in the original article and irrigation's coefficient is significant, with 
the correct sign. However, the coefficient of the wage has the wrong sign 
and is not significantly different from zero~ 
One exp).anation for this poor result ,vould seem to be the treatment 
of the wage as parametric. If differences in wages are mainly the result 
of neutral technological differences :Ln a6riculture; for example, then the 
-32-
sign of the wage coefficient may be negative. 
52 Alternatively, if low wages 
are the result of monopsony power in a state, .due to uneven distribution of 
land, we would expect that a) the coefficient of the Gini variable would 
be negative as the monop sonist \~ould tend to offer fewer leases and 
b) the negative correlation between the Gini coefficient and the wage rate 
would tend to increase the coefficient of wages. Following Bardhan and 
Srinivasan we introduce the Gini coefficient and obtain: 
Log PCT sharecropped= -6,96 + .33 Log Wage+ .40** Log Irrigation 
(SE) (5.96) (2.4) (. 22,) 
- lLi-, 17* Gini. DF = 14 
2
(6. 56) R = .47 
The only significant coefficient (at the 95 percent level) is associated 
with the Gini and it has the expected negative sign. Although it robs the 
other coefficients of significance, it does change the sign of the wage co­
efficient. These results seem to confirm the previous analysis; that the 
distribution of land is the crucial variable in any analysis of misalloca­
tion and market failure in rural Venezuela, not the tenure structure. 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper advances and tests three basic hypotheses about agricul­
tural structure and agricultural output--conservative, radical, and market 
failure due to information costs, risks, etc~ The radical view suggests 
that emphasis should be placed on sharecropping and monopsony power as 
methods of exploitation vihich, incidently, lead to a misallocation of labor 
toward the smaller farms and a loss of aggregate output. The empirical 
phenomena tvhich would support this vie,;.: would be 2 significant difference 
between the marginal products of land on a) small and large farms, and 
b) proprietor operated vso sharecropper-occupant operated farms. To 
correct these deficiencies and increase agricultur2l output the radical 
would advocate a breakup of the large estates and restrictions on rental 
contracts, such as now exist in the Brazil ond Colombia" 
By contrast, the conservative ,1ould argue that large farmers are 
better farmers 2nd their land is more productive because they are more per-
ceptive, react more quickly, and use more inputs. Tne empirical implication 
of this view is that marginal productivities of ~and should be greater on 
large farms, with the. cor espond::.ng policy i_mplication that a land reform 
would reduce total ag:r.icul tm. al ('utput. 
Finally, the rnicldJ.e 1 iie1;.1-•• b.ssed :Jn the inadequacy of simple market 
analysis-- suggests tha.'.. a varie~:y cf e:: emcntE, such c1s preference for work 
on ones 1 own lar.d._, utility :rathc::r than pr0fit max:i.mizing landlords, differences 
in risks, and information; woulci ledd to differences in input proportions 
on small and large farms" 1>JhLle this -vie,v car,~ies no presumption toward 
the relative sizes of J.and 1 s margir.a}. produce:) only the first two of the 
cited elements would lead to a difference large farms. 
If this element dominates and assuming small farmers cultivate a greater 
percentage of their land_, then Agrarian reform would still tend to increase 
agricultural output" althm1gh the go 11ernmen-:: might be forced to take some 
action to prevent other inputs from falling. 
As a preliminary tc a test of the validity of these hypotheses 
about marginal products: an aggregate Cobb Douglas Production Function was 
estimated by OLS and ACV, using Venezuelan state inputs and outputs as the 
variableso Venezuela was used because i_ts land structure and slow growth 
of agricultural output seetr,eci quit2 represe;:n:ative of Latin AmeLica during 
the fifties J whi.J.e i tJ dat.:: ceer:i.ed ,.·elatively good" 
The most reasonable estimates of the output elasticities were ob­
tained by using a mor.:cifir=d iiCV ~.::,prc;ach., The results of this estimation ,.,ere 
quite reasonable in terms of a) signific:mc'; levels of coefficients over 
• 95J b) similarity ot estirr.ate:s tc, other -c.-,:.:,-rk (Gri.liches) Hayarni··RuttanJ 
Timmer), c) a pr:i.ori ,:onjcctt.::;:·eo :cegarc.i:ig i:hr, r~,:~ative productivity of 
groups of stal~'"s e. g,. th(: .:'1ndeo (low), I.-~,tw l1a\:acaibo :.:eg5.,:,r, (highest), 
Lake Valenci~ r~gion (vs~; ~igh). 
rural cap:U:al ctod:~ 
that equality r,-F 1,-:: :gf ·.,.c",.:. p,.oducts i-Jou1d j_mp 3.y ::!quaJ.i ty b8t:wecn one output 
elasticity and ;:-hQ otL2 ..·. •,L1~·.!.pli::r1 by t'..:,' ,;.1t:io of tl-.~ two inputs. This 
constraint showea ~h1~ Lll the marginal vrociuct:s of land 0n small and large 
farms were c::;,J2nti 1:.ly, d~:'~:f:2:,~r.~'.. r•' the ,il-'.,cg11:.aJ.. p::oducts of J.and operated 
by proprietors_, :;:-r:::1·::2:~·r. 2n,~ :;hc:·;_·.:c,:;:;.·c;:;p,::.. :.; and c;ciuat,.:e:.:·s o:::- owners and non-
This second result--supporting Cheung 1 s contention that different 
tenure patterns are not evidence of rnisallcer.ition, and that the important 
variable is the distribution of ownership--was confirmed by regression 
analysis of the percentage of land sharecropped along the lines suggested 
by Bardhan·· Srinivasano Only the Gini coefficient of land distribution had 
significant explanatory power and it seemed to be inversely related to 
the wage as well as the percentage sharecropped, as would be expected. 
Finally, a regression ~as estimated with the small farm, large farm 
data vlhich allowed the mar::_:;inal 'Hoc'.ucts of land to differ from each other 
by a constant factor" This :cegressLm showed that cultivated land on large 
farms was roughly , 08 as productive as land on small farms with an upper 
bound of .20. Since the ratio of output elasticities--one estimate of re­
lative quali ties·--.,was only , 3/, tr.is means that the ob served differences in 
marginal products could not be explained. by dL':ff~rences in land quality. 
These empiricc.11 ,:·esults would tend to provide support for the radical I s 
call for .Agrarian Reform, though they would also suggest that tenure arrange• 
ments should probably continue to be left to the market. Finally, since the 
larger farms do seem to be ass,:,cinted with greater use of modern inputs, any 
agrarian reform legislati.on should include provisions to improve the distri­
bution of these inpets and the associated modern techniqueso Some attempt 
was made to carry out such a land reform in Venezuela during the sixties and 
the aggregate data support the results of this paper; though they obviously 
are only correlated ,·Jith the land 1·efo1·m and c2nnot be shown to have been 
caused by it" Irr.mediately following t;he land :reforrn7 .sgriculture became a 
leading sector and inc:reaseci i.:u :;_ni::ernat:LonaJ. competi ti.veness. However, 
30 
as might be expected from a single improvement in static efficiency, the 
growth rate of agriculture declined by the end of the decade. To maintain 
the high growth rate, continued investment and continued technical improve­
ment will be necessary. 
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is practiced, a ahift to p2asant ownership would typically cause a decline 
in productiono" 
6A F ., • • • ' · d ' . . d . . f h.quote -.ror,.: .,1 Hr.-1zi.D.an won, provi es a v1.v1.0 escr1.pt1.on o t 1.s 
process and suggest:::: tha·:: mor,c: than_ profit m.otj_vates t:he landlord. "The 
saving thus gene:tr,tc'cl ::~n the ':hree entrepr-::neurial sectors of economic 
activity of the farm ••• that accumulated with the growth of livestock, and 
that generated by t~~ commercialization of crops and animal production, 
these last two more monetary goea :i.n :~arge part to the purchase of land 
with which the .£2£.£~1. c;cpnc1ds hiB dominance and strengthens the basis of 
his power a!ld pr-2.stige. It is ::he most s::\cur2 way he sees for investment, 
almost the on1y T.-wy whic~1 hes L~ar:litional~.y expanded., Ho:re than its pro­
fitability; ~ no~•economic good a~tracts him: the social value linked to 
the dominion ove,= r,xte~1s:i.ve properties, inherent in the very system which 
prevails.," Ma:ccos 'Finisius Vilac,1 and Roberto C" de Albuquerque, _Corone1, 
Coronets., (Rio de Janeiro; Edit0ra Tempo BrasLLeiro) 1965). 
7 
· For a samplr:: of this o.:::.'.cmced view see the distinction made by 
Smith [ 1965] Let,,J<,,::n L:·nd refonv. and agrarian reforra, as well as Carroll [ 1%1). 
8R · ·. f 1 . d~nni~g ccuntc~ to ~nes2 arguments are some actc7s., a sa associate 
with market fAilurn. which ~ou:d tend to make small farms more productive: 
(1) land holding fc~ portfolio ~reasons, (2) 0.1,-m consumption by small farms 
to avoid risk; (3> land holding fo:r pr~st:i.ge, (t'.:.) land market imperfections 
such as restrictio;1S oi1. tenure, (5) labor market imperfections such as 
minimum wages, restrictions on tenure) and preference for work on owned 
plots. However, in ::he '.7enezuelan case lack of both inflation and agricultural 
price fluctuation would seem to dampen the first two motives and m1rt1mum 
wage laws have not been enforced in rural areas;. (See footnote 2). On the 
other hand, if there were no monopsony power and factors 3 - 5 were impor­
tant, it still would mean that a redistribution of land would raise agricul­
tural output. 
9See Cheung [196~]. 
10Tests of the association between the structure of land tenure or 
farm sizes and the rate of neutral technical change i:·iere not powerful enough 
to distinguish any differences in the rates. 
11 see Barraclough and Domike [1969], Carroll [1961], and ECL.A [LG3}. 
12
See Powell [1971] Chapters 3 and 5 and pp. 14-0-VH. 
13
Powell [1971] p~ 111, points out that sauatter occupation of lati­
fundia was disavowed by both the government and the peasant federation 
shortly after the passage of the Agrarian Reform Lm·J (February 1960). 
Warriner [1969] points out that in some cases the landlords organized the 
occupations in order to force the government to make overgenerous settlements. 
The willingness of the government to pay for expropriated land, and the 
fact that much of land reform consisted of settlement on unused public land 
would offset any presumption about negative effects of land reform on agricul­
tural investment. 
14See CIDA [1965, 1966]. 
15Calculated from the original sources cited in T2ble 1.. The Gini 
coefficient is equal to the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and 
the 45o line of equality and the area under the l:.s 0 line. See Morgan [ 1%2] ~ 
The method used was an approximation: G = 1 -
k 
I: (f •+-1 f •) (y • + y • I 1)
i=l 1 1 1 1, 
where G = Gini coefficient, fi = cumulative frequency of farms in class i, 
Yi= cumulative frequency of land in class i. The coefficient is an arith­
metic summary of conc.entration. However it is some·what insensitive to 
small percentage change in distribution favorini the lower groups and under­
states any movement toward equality. See Garvey [ 1S'51]. 
16 see CID.A (1065, 1966]. 
17 
see Nerlove [1S67]~ 
18See Nerlove [ 1%5]. Nerlove suggests one way out is the assumption 
that firms minimize costs, but this seems unreasonable for farms. Also 
data on factor prices, which are required, is unavailable. 
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ic·
;.,Hoch [ 1962] follows the procedure outlined here but neglects the 
problem of estimating marginal products through the use of the (assumed)
random dependent variable. See Carter & Hartley [ 195[], and Fisk [ 1966). 
20
This approach has been used on Brazilian data by Cline [1970].
Sample survey data on farms are used to demonstrate static misallocation in 
the sense of (a) amount of land left idle on large farms., and (b) declining
value of net input per unit of land, valued at market prices, as farm size 
increases, in spite of the fact that cross sectionally there appears to be 
no relation between farm size and the CD constant. Lau and Yotopolous [1971]
have used a profit function, rather than a production function, to demon­
strate the relatively greater productivity of small iarms. However, their 
profit calculations requires not only output but input value, data which are 
unavailable in Venezuela. 
21This approach has been used by Griliches [ 1%3a, 1963b, 19M.] • 
.Although there is obviously some bias due to the aggregation, little work 
has been done on estimating its nature and direction. 
22
Nerlove [ 1%5] emphasizes the importance and meaning of this assump­
tion for production functions estimated from cross sectional firm data. 
However, little work has been done on aggregate production functions. 
1965] ::md Yotopolous [1967] convert stocks 
to flows. 
24 
see Hoch [l'JG2], Zellner) etc al. [1%0], 
25 
see BCV, J_n~ Econ6mico 196!{-, 
26 Apure is ci llanos or plains state which contains much of the country's
cattle ranching and i3 subject to large annual flooding, Nueva Esparta is 
an island state, and the Federal Territories are mainly undeveloped lands 
in the jungle or on the Orinoco River Delta. Since 1963 the Territory
Delta Amacuro has been agriculturally developed to reduce food shortages
in the nearby, rapidly grm·1ing Cuidad Guayana. 
27Th e f"igures are r lows o f metric. tons .c h ' 1 f t · 1 ·or c em1.ca er 1. 1.zer. They 
are unweighted by quality and neglect organic fertilizer completely. 
Moreover they do not include the intensity of fertilizer used in the state. 
The difference between organic and chemical may have confused some farmers, 
particularly in 1950, ·ohen illiteracy was high. Finally there may be a 
timing problem in the reporting, since the inputs are the amounts used in 
the crop year and since farmers may have reported the flow amounts employed
for the harvest of 1951, rather than 1950. 
2
CNerlove [l~G5]. 
2 c _;Hoch [ 1962], rfondlak [ L61]. 
30 
see Hoch [19G2] and Nerlove [1965], 
··4G 
31 see Timmer [1971], 'l'immer 1 s results are presented in Table V. 
32Maddala [1971], Nerlov~ [1971a], Nerlcve [1971b]. 
33 see for example the rainfall and topographical maps of Venezuela. 
IBRD (1961], Griliches [1S63 8 , 1%Jb, 1965] has used this approach. 
34See Timmer [1971], pp. 736··707. 
35 see Cheung [1969]. Bardhan and Srinivasan [1971] argue that there 
is some difference in the use of i.nputs on land operated under sharecropping 
and other forms of tenurec 
36For example, Logarithmic Regressions which explain fertilizer, 
irrigation, and tractors by the amount of cultivated land on different size 
farms show that the elasticity with respect to the farms over 100 ha is 
generally significantly different th&n zero and larger than one. The other 
elnsticities, no matter what combinations are used, are generally insignificant. 
37While this fo:.:-m does have the useful property that differences in 
quality can be observed it has two defe~ts. First, it does not aggregate 
arithmetically to the form of Equation }. if the null hypothesis is satisfied 
and second, the i.and variables are treated as agg:cegc1te complements, rather 
than aggregate competitors for mobile factors, unless i:-1e also impose the 
constraint that land area is fixed" However, in that case, output would 
rise only by swi tchi.ng Lmd from one group to the other, which turns out 
to be basically what we are testing·•·· the average and marginal productivity 
of different classes of land, 
38Any division of by farm sizes is arbitrary, since the farms at the 
upper end of each class ~,.10uld probably most resemble those of the next class. 
To prevent introducing any :curther collinearity into the regression because 
of this bunching., a matrix of the simple correlation coefficients for the 
land in farm classer; 0-5, 5-20, 20··100: ove,: 100 has., was calculated. Then 
those classes with the largest correlBtion coefficients, 0-5, 5-20, 20-100 
(rou3hly .9 between the second two and 075 between the first and the sum of 
the other two separately) ,-Jere then combined since there seemed to be a 
sharp break between these three classes and the fourth) where the correla­
tion was about .2, .3, and .5, respectively. 
39Thi· s f.igu.re is. obtained by calculating a 95 confidence interval 
11R11for the value of in Equation 4 ,vhich would just equalize the marginal 
products. To form thic interval various values of R ,·Jere tried in the 
equality: 
4:,and over 100/Land under 100,} 
under 100 
which was then used to :i-eplace ~ over 100 in Equ2tion l:. Thus the value 
of R = 1/12 or a p:::-oductivit:y twelve times greater on small farms would 
certainly equate the two marginal p~oducts. In fact values down to R = 1/5 
fall into the 95 percent confidence intsrval around 1/12. If Col. 1 rather 
than Col. 4 is taken to be the unconstrainea equation) then a value of 
R = 1/3 would still fall cutside the :cange (95 percent confidence interval) 
in ·which marginal products of Col. lf are equal., 
4 0 
· see Powell [ 1971], In addition the Ac don Democratica government 
continued the program of major irrigation works and provided a great many 
wells to small m~r2rs. See MAC, ]~distica~ Agr~~- Finally, 
the price of chemical fertilizer from the gcvernment run IVP was kept arti­
fically low and constant until 1966. See BCV Informe Econ6mico, various 
years. Price supports have also been used for campesino crops and many 
storage silos were built. 
lfl
See for example: Coutsmaris and Bosz [1963], IBRD [1961]. 
42 [ ]For example, Jasperson 1969 , suggests consolidation and concen-
tration of the propram is needed. See also Warriner [1969]. 
4,3
Jasperson [196S]o 
44-See Heaton [lSGS] 
Econ6mico 1969, 
45usDA, Indir:es o_t1\grt.£2ltura1.,Production for the Western Hemisphere, 
May, 1%9. 
l,.8 
· Bardhan and Srinivasan [ 1971], 
19 1· d 1anct 1 
rental rate, but it would also increase the supply, since landlords would 
find that working the 1-:Jnd 1'Jith hired help was more expensive. Since 
both demand and supply (taking into account the amount of effort which the 
' • R1.sing· wages ,-Jould reduce deman .. f or ' oy s arecroppers at every 
sharecroppers devote to land) are d~asing fu.nctio11s of t11e rental rate., 
with D' > S 1 ; the equilibriu;n fraction of land which is offered rises. 
Irrigation can be thought of as a land augmenting innovation 'tvhich raises 
the amount of land held by landlords, thereby raising the supply of leases 
at every rental rate. 
SOA wage was calculated by multiplying the cl2ss midpoints of the 
agricultural incomes reported in DGE, Novene Censo de Poblacion and the class 
frequency. The land vari2ble was the percentage of total land operated by 
sharecroppers, rather than the cultivated i.and variable us1=d elsewhere in 
the paper. Since the B&:cdhan-Srinivasan model would lead to a corner solu­
tion, ·which would prevent the existence of either fixed price rental or 
sharecropping, regressions were also run usin3 the percentage of total land 
opM"ated by renters. In terms of sizes and significance levels of coefficients 
the results were qualitatively similar, 
-42-
51The reported re;:;ression represents the nbest" form in terms of
2
the R statistic, 
52
Bardhan and Srinivasan [ 1971] suggest that neutral technical change 
will de-crease the percentage of land which is sharecropped, but treat the 
real wage as a parameter. See footnote 50. 
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APPENDIX TABLE AI 
ACV 
ACV Constrained JI.CV 
ACV Constrained Equal Diffcrcn t 
Different Equal Marginal, Marg in:d. 
Elasticities Elasticities Products ProducU: 
L 'I'ract .02 (.08) .03 (.09) . 06 (. 11) -.01 (.09) 
L Frtlz -.07* (.03) -.10*(.03) -.11* (.04) -.08* (.03) 
L rrrig ·.07**(.-40) .09* (.04) .11* (. 04) . 07** (. 0-1) 
L Livestock .24 (.27) .28 (.30) .32 (.33) .22 (.27) 
L Lab .58* (.29) • 72* (.32) .95* (.29) .59* (.27) 
L Cofca .43* (.17) .36* (.13) .37* (.14) .41* (.11) 
DU111.tt1y (Time) - • 26 _(. 20) -.02 (.19) .01 (.32) -.13 (.27) 
L Land Under 100 ha .43* (.17) 
L Land ·over 100 ha .02 (.11) 
r; L Land .13 (.10) 
EL Land, .MP= .01 (.03) 
L Land Under 100 ha • 45 (. 17) 
L Land Over l00·Lr/Ls .01 (.02) 
F vs. Col. 1 DF = 1, 10 4~.17 6.00* 
R2 • 993 .990 .989 .994 
F 56 43 38 56 
Obs 38 38 38 38 
DF 10 11 11 11 
SSE .108 .153 .173 .104 
SER .10 .12 .13 .10 
• 
.;, 
APPENDIX TABLE AII 
OLS OLS OLS 
OLS Co:?strai.ned Cons~r2ined I)i::ferer1t 
Different E~ual ?•~argi.:,al !-~a rg i.na l. 
Elasticities Elas-t:icities ?z:-oducts P.::oducts 
Constant 8.25* (. 73) 7.60*(.73) 7.95*(.94) 7. 79* (. 78) 
L Tract .12* (-.05) .13* (. 05) .19* (.05) • 10* (. 05) 
L Frtlz -.05**(.04) -.09*(.03) -.05(.04) -.06**(.03) 
L Irrig • 04 (. 05) -.Ol(.05) .03(.06) • 04 (. 05) 
L Livestock -.13**(.07) -.08 (.08} - .1.0 (. 09) -.10(.08) 
L Lab .21(.23)­ .25(.24) .72*(.l7) .12 (. 21) 
L Cofca .1.0* (. 04) .14* (. 04) .16*(.05) .10* (. 04) 
Du,_--:-z.y {Tin:;.e) -.13**(.08) • 11 ( .15} -.1.6 ( .17}. 
L Lar..d Under 100 ha .51* (. l4) 
Land. l00 c1a • 08 {.14) 
L Land .28*(.ll} 
:EL La:;.d MP's = ·• Ol {. 02) 
L Land under 100 ha .68*(.18) 
L La~d Over 100-Lr/Ls .03*(.02} 
F vs. Col. 1 DF = 1,28 5.63* ll.9* 
2 
_c-. R .928 .9129 .897 .932 
F 40 38 32 43 
Obs 38 38 38 38 
DP 28 29 29 28 
SSE 1.148 1.381 l.635 l.072 
SER .20 .22 .24 .20 
